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Abstract
Cascading failures in power systems normally occur as a result of initial disturbance or faults
on electrical elements, closely followed by errors of human operators. It remains a great challenge
to systematically trace the source of cascading failures in power systems. In this paper, we develop
a mathematical model to describe the cascading dynamics of transmission lines in power networks.
In particular, the direct current (DC) power flow equation is employed to calculate the transmission
power on the branches. By regarding the disturbances on the elements as the control inputs, we for-
mulate the problem of determining the initial disturbances causing the cascading blackout of power
grids in the framework of optimal control theory, and the magnitude of disturbances or faults on the
selected branch can be obtained by solving the system of algebraic equations. Moreover, an iterative
search algorithm is proposed to look for the optimal solution leading to the worst case of cascading
failures. Theoretical analysis guarantees the asymptotic convergence of the iterative search algo-
rithm. Finally, numerical simulations are carried out in IEEE 9 Bus System and IEEE 14 Bus System
to validate the proposed approach.
1 Introduction
The stability and secure operation of power grids have a great impact on other interdependent critical
infrastructure systems such as energy system, transportation system, finance system and communication
system. Nevertheless, contingencies on vulnerable components of power systems and errors of human
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operators could trigger the chain reactions ending up with the large blackout of power networks. For in-
stance, the North America cascading blackout on August 14, 2003 made 50 million people living without
electricity [1]. The misoperation of a German operator in November 2006 triggered a chain reaction of
power grids and finally caused 15 million Europeans losing access to power [2]. Recently, a relay fault
near Taj Mahal in India gave rise to a severe cascading blackout on July 31, 2012 affecting 600 million
people. Thus, it is vital to identify worst possible attacks or initial disturbances on the critical electrical
elements in advance and develop effective protection strategies to alleviate the cascading blackout of
power systems.
A cascading blackout of power system is defined as a sequence of component outages that include at
least one triggering component outage and subsequent tripping component outages due to the overloading
of transmission lines and situational awareness errors of human operators [3, 4, 5]. Note that a cascading
failure does not necessarily lead to a cascading blackout or load shedding. The existing cascading models
basically fall into 3 categories [3]. The first type of models only reveals the topological property and
ignores physics of power grids, and thus is unable to accurately describe the cascading evolution of
power networks in practice [6, 7]. The second type of models focuses on the quasi-steady-state of power
systems and computes the power flow on branches by solving the DC or alternating current (AC) power
flow equations. The third one resorts to the dynamic modeling in order to investigate the effects of
component dynamics on the emergence of cascading failures [8, 9, 10]. A dynamic model of cascading
failure was presented to deal with the interdependencies of different mechanisms [10], which takes into
account the transient dynamics of generators and protective relays.
The disturbances on the transmission lines of power grids generally take the form of impedance or
admittance changes in existing work [11, 12, 13]. For example, the outage of a transmission line leads to
the infinite impedance or zero admittance between two relevant buses. Linear or nonlinear programming
is normally employed to formulate the problem of determining the disruptive disturbances. [11] presents
two different optimization formulations to analyze the vulnerability of power grids. Specifically, the
nonlinear programming is adopted to address the voltage disturbance, and nonlinear bilevel optimization
is employed to deal with the power adjustment. The existing work has largely ignored the cascading
process of transmission lines when the power system is suffering from disruptive disturbances. Previous
optimization formulations are therefore not sufficient to describe the cascading dynamics of transmis-
sion lines in practice since the final configuration of power networks strongly depends on the dynamic
evolution of transmission lines besides initial conditions.
In this paper we will develop a cascading model of power networks to describe the dynamical evo-
lution of transmission lines. Moreover, the problem of determining the cause of cascading failure is
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formulated in the framework of optimal control theory by treating the disruptive disturbances of power
systems as control inputs in the optimal control system. The proposed approach provides a new insight
into tracing disruptive disturbances on vulnerable components of power grids.
The outline of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the cascading model of power
systems and the optimal control approach. Section 3 provides theoretical results for the problem of iden-
tifying disruptive disturbances, followed by simulations and validation on IEEE 9 and 14 Bus Systems
in Section 4. Finally, we conclude the paper and discuss future work in Section 5.
2 Problem Formulation
The power system is basically composed of power stations, transformers, power transmission networks,
distribution stations and consumers (see Fig. 1). In this work, we are interested in identifying disruptive
disturbances (e.g., lightning or storm) on transmission lines that trigger the chain reaction and cause the
cascading blackout of power grids. The disturbances give rise to the admittance changes of transmission
lines, which results in the rebalance of power flow in power grids. The overloading of transmission
lines causes certain circuit breakers to sever the corresponding branches and readjust the power network
topology. The above process does not pause until the power grid reaches a new steady state and trans-
mission lines are not severed any more. In this section, we will propose a cascading model to describe
the cascading process of transmission lines, where the DC power flow equation is solved to obtain the
power flow on each branch. More significantly, the mathematical formulation based on optimal control
is presented by treating the disruptive disturbances of power grids as the control inputs in the optimal
control system.
2.1 Cascading model
The cascading model describes the evolution of branch admittance as a result of overloading on trans-
mission lines and the ensuing branch outage. To characterize the connection state of transmission line,
we introduce the state function of the transmission line that connects Bus i and Bus j as follows
g(Pi j,ci j) =

0, |Pi j| ≥
√
c2i j +
pi
2σ ;
1, |Pi j| ≤
√
c2i j− pi2σ ;
1−sinσ(P2i j−c2i j)
2 , otherwise.
(1)
where i, j ∈ Inb = {1,2, ...,nb}, i 6= j and nb is the total number of buses in the power system. σ is a
tunable positive parameter. Pi j refers to the transmitted power on the transmission line that links Bus i
3
Figure 1: Schematic diagram of power systems suffering from lightning on branches.
and Bus j, and ci j denotes its power threshold. The state function g(Pi j,ci j) is differentiable with respect
to Pi j, and it more closely resembles the step function as σ increases (see Fig. 2). The transmission line
is in good condition when g(Pi j,ci j) = 1, while g(Pi j,ci j) = 0 implies that the transmission line has been
severed by the circuit breaker. The cascading model of power systems at the k-th step can be presented
as
Y k+1p = G(P
k
i j,ci j) ·Y kp +Eik uk, k = 0,1,2, ...m−1 (2)
where Y kp = (y
k
p,1,y
k
p,2, ...,y
k
p,n)
T is the admittance vector for the n transmission lines or branches at the
k-th step, and uk = (uk,1,uk,2, ...,uk,n)T denotes the control input on transmission lines. m is the total
number of cascading steps in power networks. G(Pki j,ci j) and Eik are the diagonal matrixes defined as
G(Pki j,ci j) =

g(Pki1 j1 ,ci1 j1) 0 . 0
0 g(Pki2 j2 ,ci2 j2) . 0
. . . .
0 0 . g(Pkin jn ,cin jn)

and
Eik = diag
(
eTik
)
= diag(0, ..,0,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ik
,0, ...,0) ∈ Rn×n.
Here Eik is used to select the ik-th branch to add the control input on. The intuitive interpretation of
Cascading Model (2) is that the admittance of transmission line becomes zero and remains unchanged
after the branch outage and that the control input is added on the selected transmission line to directly
change its admittance at the initial step.
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Figure 2: Threshold function g(Pi j,ci j) with ci j = 5.
Remark 2.1. Without the reclosing operation of circuit breakers, the maximum number of cascading
steps m should be less than or equal to n, i.e., the total number of transmission lines in the power
network. With the reclosing operation of circuit breakers, the cascading model is determined by
Y k+1p = G(P
k
i j,ci j) ·Y 0p +Eik uk k = 0,1,2, ...m−1
This ensures that the transmission line gets reconnected once its transmission power is less than the
specified threshold.
2.2 DC power flow equation
In this work, we focus on the state evolution of transmission lines or mains in power systems and thus
compute the DC power flow to deal with the overloading problem. Specifically, the DC power flow
equation is given by
Pi =
nb
∑
j=1
Bi jθi j =
nb
∑
j=1
Bi j(θi−θ j) (3)
where Pi and θi refer to the injection power and voltage phase angle of Bus i, respectively. Bi j represents
the mutual susceptance between Bus i and Bus j, where i, j ∈ Inb . Equation (3) can be rewritten in matrix
form [14]
P = Bθ
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where
P =

P1
P2
.
Pnb
 , B =

∑nbi=2 B1i −B12 . B1nb
−B21 ∑nbi=1,i 6=2 B2i . B2nb
. . . .
−Bnb1 −Bnb2 . ∑nb−1i=1 Bnbi
 , θ =

θ1
θ2
.
θnb

Actually, B is the nodal admittance matrix of power networks while using the DC power flow. The nodal
admittance matrix Y kb at the k-th time step can be obtained as
Y kb = A
T diag(Y kp )A
where A denotes the branch-bus incidence matrix [15]. Therefore, the matrix B at the k-th time step of
cascading failure can be calculated as
Bk = Y kb = A
T diag(Y kp )A, Y
k
p = (y
k
p,1,y
k
p,2, ...,y
k
p,n)
T , ykp,i =−
1
Im(zkp,i)
, i ∈ In = {1,2, ...,n}
where zkp,i denotes the impedance of the i-th branch at the k-th time step. Then the DC power flow
equation at the k-th time step is given by
Pk = Bkθ k = Y kb θ
k (4)
where Pk = (Pk1 ,P
k
2 , ...,P
k
nb)
T and θ k = (θ k1 ,θ
k
2 , ...,θ
k
nb)
T . During the cascading blackout, the power net-
work may be divided into several subnetworks (i.e., islands), which can be identified by analyzing the
nodal admittance matrix Y kb . Suppose Y
k
b is composed of q isolated components or subnetworks denoted
by Si, i ∈ Iq = {1,2, ...,q} and each subnetwork Si includes ki buses, i.e., Si = {i1, i2, ..., iki}, where i1,
i2,..., iki denote the bus identity (ID) numbers and ∑
q
i=1 ki = nb. Notice that Bus i1 in Subnetwork Si is
designated as the reference bus, which is normally a generator bus in practice. The nodal admittance
matrix of the i-th subnetwork can be computed as
Y kb,i =

eTi1
eTi2
.
eTiki
Y kb
(
ei1 ,ei2 , ...,eiki
)
, i ∈ Iq
For simplicity, we introduce two operators ∗ and−1∗ to facilitate the analytical expression and theoretical
analysis of solving the DC power flow equation.
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Definition 2.1. Given the nodal admittance matrix Y kb , the operators ∗ and −1∗ are defined by
(
Y kb
)∗
=
q
∑
i=1
(
ei1 ,ei2 , ...,eiki
) 0 0Tki−1
0ki−1 Iki−1
Y kb,i
 0 0Tki−1
0ki−1 Iki−1


eTi1
eTi2
.
eTiki

and
(
Y kb
)−1∗
=
q
∑
i=1
(
ei1 ,ei2 , ...,eiki
) 0Tki−1
Iki−1
( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )Y kb,i
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
−1( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )

eTi1
eTi2
.
eTiki
 ,
respectively, where
Iki−1 =

1 0 . 0
0 1 . 0
. . . 0
0 0 . 1
 ∈ R(ki−1)×(ki−1), 0ki−1 =

0
0
.
0
 ∈ Rki−1
Remark 2.2. The power network represented by the nodal admittance matrix Y kb can be decomposed
into q isolated subnetworks, and each subnetwork is described by a submatrix Y kb,i, i ∈ Iq. The operators
∗ and −1∗ replace all the elements in the 1-st row and the 1-st column of Y kb,i with 0. Moreover, the
operator −1∗ also replaces the remaining part of Y kb,i with its inverse matrix. According to algebraic
graph theory, the rank of nodal admittance matrix Y kb,i is ki−1 since each subnetwork Si, i ∈ {1,2, ...,q}
is connected [16]. Thus, it is guaranteed that the matrix
(
0ki−1 Iki−1
)
Y kb,i
 0Tki−1
Iki−1

has full rank ki−1 and thus it is invertible.
2.3 Optimization formulation
The cascading dynamics of power system is composed of the cascading model defined by Equation (2)
and DC power flow equation described by Equation (4), and these two components are coupled with
each other, which characterizes the cascading blackout of power grids after suffering from disruptive
disturbances. The optimal control algorithm allows us to obtain the disruptive disturbances by treating the
7
Figure 3: Optimal control approach to identifying disruptive disturbances.
disturbances as the control inputs of the optimal control system (see Fig. 3). Specifically, the cascading
model describes the outage of overloading branches and updates the admittance on transmission lines
with the latest power flow, which is provided by the DC power flow equation. Meanwhile, the DC power
flow equation is solved with the up-to-date admittance of branches from the cascading model. The above
two processes occur iteratively in describing the evolution of admittance and transmission power on
transmission lines. Moreover, the cascading dynamics of power system exactly functions as the state
equation of optimal control system. In this way, the optimal control algorithm allows us to gain the
control input or disruptive disturbance that triggers the chain reaction of the proposed cascading model.
The identification of disruptive disturbances in power systems can be formulated as the following
optimal control problem.
min
uk
J(Y mp ,uk) (5)
with the cost function
J(Y mp ,uk) = T(Y
m
p )+ ε
m−1
∑
k=0
‖uk‖2
max{0, ι− k} (6)
where 1n =(1,1, ...,1)T ∈Rn and ε is a positive weight. ‖·‖ represents the 2-norm. As mentioned before,
the state equation of the optimal control system consists of Equations (2) and (4). The above cost function
includes two terms. Specifically, the first term T(Y mp ) is differentiable with respect to Y
m
p , and it quantifies
the power state or connectivity of power networks at the final step of cascading blackout, and the second
term characterizes the control energy at the first ι time steps with the constraint 1 ≤ ι ≤ (m− 1). In
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practice, T(Y mp ) is designed according to the specific concerns about the worst-case scenario in power
systems. In particular, the parameter ε is set small enough so that the first term dominates in the cost
function. The objective is to minimize T(Y mp ) by adding the appropriate control input uk on the branches
of power systems at the given time step.
Remark 2.3. In practice, the disruptive disturbances of power systems come from contingencies such as
lightning and situational awareness errors of human operators, etc.
3 Theoretical Analysis
In this section, we will present some theoretical results on the proposed optimal control algorithm. First
of all, the properties of operators ∗ and −1∗ are given by the following lemmas.
Lemma 3.1. For the nodal admittance matrix Y kb ∈ Rnb×nb , the equations
(
Y kb
)∗(
Y kb
)−1∗
=
(
Y kb
)−1∗ (
Y kb
)∗
=
q
∑
i=1
(
ei1 ,ei2 , ...,eiki
)
diag(0,1Tki−1)

eTi1
eTi2
.
eTiki
 (7)
hold.
Proof. It follows from Definition 2.1 that(
Y kb
)∗(
Y kb
)−1∗
=
q
∑
i=1
(
ei1 ,ei2 , ...,eiki
) 0 0Tki−1
0ki−1 Iki−1
Y kb,i
 0 0Tki−1
0ki−1 Iki−1

·
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )Y kb,i
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
−1( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )

eTi1
eTi2
.
eTiki

=
q
∑
i=1
(
ei1 ,ei2 , ...,eiki
) 0Tki−1
Iki−1
( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )Y kb,i
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )
·
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )Y kb,i
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
−1( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )

eTi1
eTi2
.
eTiki

.
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Moreover, it follows from( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )Y kb,i
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )Y kb,i
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
−1
=
( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )Y kb,i
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
 Iki−1
( 0ki−1 Iki−1 )Y kb,i
 0Tki−1
Iki−1
−1
= Iki−1
that
(
Y kb
)∗(
Y kb
)−1∗
=
q
∑
i=1
(
ei1 ,ei2 , ...,eiki
)
diag(0,1Tki−1)

eTi1
eTi2
.
eTiki
 .
Likewise, we can prove
(
Y kb
)−1∗ (
Y kb
)∗
=
q
∑
i=1
(
ei1 ,ei2 , ...,eiki
)
diag(0,1Tki−1)

eTi1
eTi2
.
eTiki
 .
Lemma 3.1 indicates that the two operators ∗ and −1∗ are commutative for the same square ma-
trix. Given the injection power for each bus Pk = (Pk1 ,P
k
2 , ...,P
k
nb)
T at the k-th time step, the quantitative
relationship between Y kp and power flow on each branch is presented as follows.
Lemma 3.2.
Pki j = e
T
i A
T diag(Y kp )Ae j(ei− e j)T (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
Pk, i, j ∈ Inb
where ei = (0, ...,0,1︸ ︷︷ ︸
i−th
,0, ...0)T ∈ Rn.
Proof. It follows from the solution to DC power flow equation θ k = (Bk)−1∗Pk and Bk = AT diag(Y kp )A
that
Pki j = B
k
i j(θ
k
i −θ kj ) = eTi Bke j(ei− e j)Tθ k
= eTi B
ke j(ei− e j)T (Bk)−1∗Pk
= eTi A
T diag(Y kp )Ae j(ei− e j)T (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
Pk.
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Similar to the matrix inversion, the operators ∗ and −1∗ satisfy the following equation in terms of
the derivative operation.
Lemma 3.3.
∂ (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
∂ykp,i
=−(AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
(AT diag(ei)A)∗(AT diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗ , i ∈ In.
Proof. Lemma 3.1 allows to obtain
(AT diag(Y kp )A)
∗ · (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
=
q
∑
i=1
(
ei1 ,ei2 , ...,eiki
)
diag(0,1Tki−1)

eTi1
eTi2
.
eTiki
 .
Since the derivative of the constant is 0, we have
∂ [(AT diag(Y kp )A)∗ · (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
]
∂ykp,i
=
∂ (AT diag(Y kp )A)∗
∂ykp,i
· (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
+(AT diag(Y kp )A)
∗ · ∂ (A
T diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗
∂ykp,i
=
∂
∂ykp,i
q
∑
i=1
(
ei1 ,ei2 , ...,eiki
)
diag(0,1Tki−1)

eTi1
eTi2
.
eTiki
= 0nb×nb .
Then it follows from
(AT diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗ [
∂ (AT diag(Y kp )A)∗
∂ykp,i
· (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
+(AT diag(Y kp )A)
∗ · ∂ (A
T diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗
∂ykp,i
]
= (AT diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗ · ∂ (A
T diag(Y kp )A)
∗
∂ykp,i
· (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
+diag(0,1Tn−1) ·
∂ (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
∂ykp,i
= (AT diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗ · ∂ (A
T diag(Y kp )A)
∗
∂ykp,i
· (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
+
∂ (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
∂ykp,i
= 0nb×nb
that
∂ (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
∂ykp,i
=−(AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗ ∂ (AT diag(Y kp )A)∗
∂ykp,i
(AT diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗
=−(AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
(AT diag(
∂Y kP
∂ykp,i
)A)∗(AT diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗
=−(AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
(AT diag(ei)A)∗(AT diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗ .
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Next, we present theoretical results relevant to optimal control problem (5). For the discrete time
nonlinear system, optimal control theory provides the necessary conditions for deriving the control input
to minimize the given cost function.
Theorem 3.1. For the discrete time optimal control problem
min
uk
J(xk,uk)
with the state equation
xk+1 = f (xk,uk), k = 0,1, ...,m−1
and the cost function
J(xk,uk) = φ(xm)+
m−1
∑
k=0
L(xk,uk),
the necessary conditions for the optimal control input u∗k are given as follows
1. xk+1 = f (xk,uk)
2. λk = ( ∂ f∂xk )
Tλk+1+ ∂L∂xk
3. ( ∂ f∂uk )
Tλk+1+ ∂L∂uk = 0
4. λm = ∂Φ∂xm
Proof. It is a special case (i.e., time invariant case) of the optimal control for the time-varying discrete
time nonlinear system in [17]. Hence the proof is omitted.
By applying Theorem 3.1 to the optimal control problem (5), we obtain the necessary conditions for
identifying the disruptive disturbance of power systems with the cascading model (2) and the DC power
flow equation (4).
Theorem 3.2. The necessary condition for the optimal control problem (5) corresponds to the solution
of the following system of algebraic equations.
Y k+1p −G(Pki j,ci j)Y kp +
max{0, ι− k}
2ε
Eik
m−k−2
∏
s=0
∂Y m−sp
∂Y m−s−1p
· ∂T(Y
m
p )
∂Y mp
= 0n, k = 0,1, ...,m−1 (8)
and the optimal control input is given by
uk =−max{0, ι− k}2ε Eik
m−k−2
∏
s=0
∂Y m−sp
∂Y m−s−1p
· ∂T(Y
m
p )
∂Y mp
, k = 0,1, ...,m−1 (9)
Proof. See Appendix.
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Table 1: Iterative Search Algorithm.
1: Set the maximum number of steps imax, i = 0 and J∗ = Jmax
2: while (i <= imax)
3: Solve the system of algebraic equation (8)
4: Compute the control input ui from (9)
5: Validate the control input ui in (2)
6: Compute the resulting cost function Ji from (6)
7: if (Ji < J∗)
8: Set u∗ = ui and J∗ = Ji
9: end if
10: Set i = i+1
11: end while
It is necessary to winnow the solutions to Equation (8), since they just satisfy necessary conditions for
optimal control problem (5). Thus, we introduce a search algorithm to explore the optimal control input
or initial disturbances. Table 1 presents the implementation process of the Iterative Search Algorithm
(ISA) in details. First of all, we set the maximum iterative steps imax of the ISA and the initial value of
cost function J∗, which is a sufficiently large number Jmax and is larger than the maximum value of the
cost function. The solution to the system of algebraic equation (8) allows us to obtain the control input ui
from (9). Then we compute the cost function Ji from (5) by adding the control input ui in power systems.
Then J∗ and u∗ are replaced with Ji and ui if Ji is less than J∗. Afterwards, the algorithm goes to the next
iteration and starts solving the system of algebraic equation (8) once again.
Regarding the Iterative Search Algorithm in Table 1, we have the following theoretical result.
Theorem 3.3. The Iterative Search Algorithm in Table 1 ensures that the cost function J∗ and control
input u∗ converge to the optima as the iteration steps imax go to infinity.
Proof. The ISA in Table 1 indicates that the cost function J∗ decreases monotonically as time goes.
Considering that J∗ is the lower bounded (i.e., J∗ ≥ 0), it can be proved that J∗ converges to the infimum
according to monotone convergence theorem in real analysis [18]. For each iteration, the system of
algebraic equation (8) is solved with a random initial condition. As a result, the cost function J∗ and
control input u∗ converge to the optima as the iteration steps imax go to infinity.
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4 Simulation and Validation
In this section, we implement the proposed Disturbance Identification Algorithm to search for the dis-
ruptive disturbances added on selected branches in IEEE 9 Bus System and IEEE 14 Bus System. The
numerical results on disruptive disturbances are validated by disturbing the selected branch with the com-
puted magnitude of disturbance in the corresponding IEEE Bus Systems. To sever as many branches as
possible, we define the terminal constraint in cost function (6) as follows
T (Y mp ) =
1
2
‖Y mp ‖2
and derive its partial derivative with respect to Y mp
∂T(Y mp )
∂Y mp
= Y mp (10)
By substituting (10) into (8), we obtain the desired system of algebraic equations.
Y k+1p −G(Pki j,ci j)Y kp +
max{0, ι− k}
2ε
Eik
m−k−2
∏
s=0
∂Y m−sp
∂Y m−s−1p
Y mp = 0n, k = 0,1, ...,m−1. (11)
4.1 IEEE 9 Bus System
The parameter settings of IEEE 9 Bus System (see Fig. 4) are presented in Table 2 and Table 3 [19]. It is
worth noting that R represents the reference bus (slack bus). G refers to the generator bus and L stands
for the load bus in Table 3. Per unit values are adopted with the base value 100MVA. Other parameters
for the dynamic model of power system are given as σ = 5×104, ι = 1, ε = 10−4, imax = 10, Jmax = 106
and m = 9. The solver “fsolve” in Matlab is employed to solve the system of algebraic equations (11).
Figure 5 shows the computed disturbance and corresponding cost for each branch by the ISA in
Table 1. It is observed that the disturbance on Branch 2 results in the least cost, which indicates the most
outage branches in the final step. In particular, Fig. 6 presents the time evolution while applying the ISA
to search for the desired disturbance or optimal control input on Branch 2 in 10 rounds. After 7 rounds,
the cost function is lowered greatly to the bottom and keeps invariant afterwards. Correspondingly, the
computed control input converges to 10.87, which exactly severs Branch 2.
Branch 2 is selected to add the disruptive disturbance that initiates the chain reaction of cascading
blackout. In Fig. 7, red balls denote the generator buses, and green ones refer to the load buses. Bus
identity (ID) numbers and branch ID numbers are marked as well. The arrows represent the power flow
on each branch. A branch is severed once its transmission power exceeds the given threshold. The arrow
disappears if there is no power transmission on the branch. The power system is running in the normal
14
Figure 4: IEEE 9 Bus System.
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Figure 5: Control input and the resulted cost on each branch in IEEE 9 Bus System.
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Figure 6: Time evolution of control input and the resulted cost on Branch 2.
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Table 2: IEEE 9 Bus System-Branch data.
Branch number Source bus Sink bus Reactance Power threshold
1 1 4 0.058 1.0
2 2 7 0.092 1.8
3 3 9 0.170 1.0
4 4 5 0.059 0.5
5 4 6 0.101 0.5
6 7 5 0.072 1.0
7 7 8 0.063 1.0
8 9 6 0.161 1.0
9 9 8 0.085 1.0
Table 3: IEEE 9 Bus System-Bus data.
Bus number Bus type Power injection
1 R 0.71
2 G 1.63
3 G 0.85
4 L 0
5 L -1.25
6 L -0.9
7 L 0
8 L -1
9 L 0
state at Step 1. Then the disruptive disturbance computed by the ISA (susceptance decrement 10.87) is
added to sever Branch 2 at Step 2. Then Branch 1, Branch 4 and Branch 5 break off simultaneously at
Step 3. Subsequently, Branch 3, Branch 6, Branch 7 and Branch 9 are removed from the power system
at Step 4. As a result, the power network is divided into 8 islands without any power consumption. In
particular, there is no power transmission on Branch 8 since Bus 6 and Bus 9 are both load buses.
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Figure 7: Cascading process of the IEEE 9 Bus System under the computed initial disturbances on
Branch 2.
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Figure 8: IEEE 14 Bus System.
4.2 IEEE 14 Bus System
The ISA is also implemented on the IEEE 14 Bus System (see Fig. 8) to trace the initial disturbance on
branches that result in the worst blackout of power network. The relevant branch data and bus data are
shown in Table 4 and Table 5, respectively [19]. Other parameters for are given as follows: σ = 5×104,
ε = 10−4, ι = 1, imax = 10, Jmax = 106 and m= 10. Figure 9 presents the computed control input on each
branch and the resulted cost level at the final step. Of all the computed disturbances, we can observe that
the disturbance on Branch 6 (red link) leads to the least value (34.87) of cost function, which implies
the worst blackout of power networks. The process of iterative search for the least cost value and the
corresponding control input is illustrated in Fig. 10. In particular, the cascading process caused by the
initial admittance change of 1.95 on Branch 6 is shown in Fig. 11. The process ends up with 2 connected
subnetworks and 8 isolated buses after 6 cascading steps. The subnetwork with one generator bus (Bus
6) and 3 load buses (Bus 5, Bus 12 and Bus 13) is still in operation, while the other one with two load
buses (Bus 9 and Bus 14) stops running due to the lack of power supply.
The validation results on IEEE 9 Bus System and IEEE 14 Bus System demonstrate the power net-
work can be completely destroyed by disruptive disturbances on branches. In the simulations, the con-
vergence rate of the ISA strongly depends on the initial condition of solving the system of algebraic
equation (8) in each iteration.
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Table 4: IEEE 14 Bus System-Branch data.
Branch number Source bus Sink bus Reactance Power threshold
1 1 2 0.059 0.3
2 1 5 0.223 0.3
3 2 3 0.198 0.4
4 2 4 0.176 0.3
5 2 5 0.174 0.3
6 3 4 0.171 0.7
7 4 5 0.042 0.3
8 4 7 0.209 0.3
9 4 9 0.556 0.3
10 5 6 0.252 0.3
11 6 11 0.199 0.3
12 6 12 0.256 0.3
13 6 13 0.130 0.3
14 7 8 0.176 0.3
15 7 9 0.110 0.3
16 9 10 0.085 0.3
17 9 14 0.270 0.3
18 10 11 0.192 0.3
19 12 13 0.200 0.3
20 13 14 0.348 0.3
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Figure 9: Control input and the resulted cost on each branch of the IEEE 14 Bus System.
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Figure 10: Time evolution of control input and the resulted cost on Branch 6.
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Figure 11: Cascading process of the IEEE 14 Bus System under the computed initial disturbances on
Branch 6.
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Table 5: IEEE 14 Bus System-Bus data.
Bus number Bus type Power injection
1 R 0
2 G 0.217
3 G 0.942
4 L -0.478
5 L -0.076
6 G 0.112
7 L 0
8 G 0
9 L -0.295
10 L -0.090
11 L -0.035
12 L -0.061
13 L -0.135
14 L -0.149
5 Conclusions
A cascading model of transmission lines was developed to describe the evolution of branches on power
systems under disruptive contingencies. With the cascading model and DC power flow equation, the
identification problem of worst case cascading failures was formulated with the aid of optimal control
theory by treating the disturbances as the control inputs. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness
of our approach. The proposed approach allows us to determine the most disruptive disturbances on the
targeted branch, which provides a new perspective of designing the corresponding protection strategy to
enhance the resilience and stability of power system and interdependent critical infrastructure systems.
Future work includes improving the cascading dynamics of power system with AC power flow equation
and designing cooperative control strategies of protective relay to protect power systems [20, 21].
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Appendix
Now we present the proof of Theorem 3.2. From Theorem 3.1, the necessary conditions for the optimal
control problem (5) can be determined as
Y k+1p = G(P
k
i j,ci j) ·Y kp +Eik uk (12)
(
∂Y k+1p
∂uk
)T
λk+1+
ε
max{0, ι− k} ·
∂‖uk‖2
∂uk
= 0 (13)
λk =
(
∂Y k+1p
∂Y kp
)T
λk+1+
ε
max{0, ι− k} ·
∂‖uk‖2
∂Y kp
(14)
∂T(Y mp )
∂Y mp
−λm = 0n (15)
where 0n = (0,0, ...,0)T ∈ Rn. Thus, solving Equation (13) leads to
uk =−Eik
λk+1
2ε
max{0, ι− k} (16)
and simplifying Equation (14) yields
λk =
(
∂Y k+1p
∂Y kp
)T
λk+1 (17)
with the final condition λm =
∂T(Y mp )
∂Y mp
being derived from Equation (15). Therefore, we have
λk+1 =
m−k−2
∏
s=0
∂Y m−sp
∂Y m−s−1p
· ∂T(Y
m
p )
∂Y mp
. (18)
Combining Equations (16) and (18), we obtain
uk =−max{0, ι− k}2ε Eik
m−k−2
∏
s=0
∂Y m−sp
∂Y m−s−1p
· ∂T(Y
m
p )
∂Y mp
(19)
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Substituting (19) into (12) yields
Y k+1p −G(Pki j,ci j)Y kp +
max{0, ι− k}
2ε
Eik
m−k−2
∏
s=0
∂Y m−sp
∂Y m−s−1p
· ∂T(Y
m
p )
∂Y mp
= 0n, k = 0,1, ...,m−1
which is the integrated mathematical representation of necessary conditions (12), (13), (14) and (15) for
the optimal control problem (5).
Next, we focus on the computation of the matrix
∂Y k+1p
∂Y kp
, k = 0,1, ...,m−1
Clearly, this matrix can be rewritten as
∂Y k+1p
∂Y kp
=

∂yk+1p,1
∂ykp,1
∂yk+1p,1
∂ykp,2
.
∂yk+1p,1
∂ykp,n
∂yk+1p,2
∂ykp,1
∂yk+1p,2
∂ykp,2
.
∂yk+1p,2
∂ykp,n
. . . .
∂yk+1p,n
∂ykp,1
∂yk+1p,n
∂ykp,2
.
∂yk+1p,n
∂ykp,n

(20)
where
yk+1p,l = g(P
k
il jl ,cil jl )y
k
p,l + e
T
l Eik uk.
Therefore, we have
∂yk+1p,l
∂ykp,s
=
∂g(Pkil jl ,cil jl )
∂ykp,s
ykp,l +g(P
k
il jl ,cil jl )
∂ykp,l
∂ykp,s
=
∂g(Pkil jl ,cil jl )
∂Pkil jl
· ∂P
k
il jl
∂ykp,s
ykp,l +g(P
k
il jl ,cil jl )
∂ykp,l
∂ykp,s
, s, l = 1,2, ...,n
(21)
where
∂ykp,l
∂ykp,s
=
 1, s = l,0, s 6= l. (22)
and
∂g(Pkil jl ,cil jl )
∂Pkil jl
=
 −Pkil jlσ cosσ((Pkil jl )2− c2il jl ),
√
c2il jl − pi2σ < |Pkil jl |<
√
c2il jl +
pi
2σ ;
0, otherwise.
(23)
24
It follows from Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 that
∂Pkil jl
∂ykp,s
=
∂
[
eTil A
T diag(Y kp )Ae jl (eil − e jl )T (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
Pk
]
∂ykp,s
=
∂
[
eTil A
T diag(Y kp )Ae jl
]
∂ykp,s
(eil − e jl )T (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
Pk
+ eTil A
T diag(Y kp )Ae jl
∂
[
(eil − e jl )T (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
Pk
]
∂ykp,s
= eTil A
T diag
(
∂Y kp
∂ykp,s
)
Ae jl (eil − e jl )T (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
Pk
+ eTil A
T diag(Y kp )Ae jl (eil − e jl )T
∂ (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
∂ykp,s
Pk
= eTil A
T diag(es)Ae jl (eil − e jl )T (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
Pk
− eTil AT diag(Y kp )Ae jl (eil − e jl )T (AT diag(Y kp )A)−1
∗
(AT diag(es)A)∗(AT diag(Y kp )A)
−1∗Pk.
(24)
Thus, each element in Matrix (20) is explicitly expressed by Equation (21), which can be obtained by
taking into account Equations (1), (22), (23) and (24). This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
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